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Employment, Trade and Foreign
Investment Effects of NAFTA
Calvin D. Siebert*
Mahmood A. Zaidi**
The economic implications of the North American Free
Trade Agreement1 (NAFTA) have been a topic of political contro-
versy in the United States, Mexico and Canada for several
years. Despite the recent adoption of NAFTA by the United
States, NAFTA will probably remain politically controversial for
the next several years.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a theoretical and
empirical overview of the economic basis of the controversy and
not to provide additional evidence on the impact of NAFTA.
While most economists would agree that movement toward free
trade is improving, any such change will result in some gainers
and some losers. In particular, there will be some employment
increases and decreases from the elimination of tariff walls be-
tween the countries. Employment levels in both the import-
competing and export industries will be affected with import-
competing industries likely to bear the brunt of the impact.
NAFTA, however, is more than a trade agreement. It also
liberalizes investment.2 In fact, one of the key reasons for Mex-
ico's participation was the need to attract investment. 3 The idea
was to bring in foreign capital in order to be able to import goods
and services for the development of Mexican infrastructure,
manufacturing, agriculture, etc. This leads to a conflict between
whether NAFTA should be a trade agreement which stresses the
opportunities for Mexican exports or whether it should stress in-
* Professor of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City.
** Professor and Director, International Programs, University of Minne-
sota Carlson School of Management, Minneapolis.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 289, 32 I.L.M. 605.
2. See generally id. ch. 11-16.
3. See John Whalley & Colleen Hamilton, The Intellectual Underpinnings
of North American Economic Integration, 4 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43, 64
(1995) (discussing the economic and political reasons for the passage of
NAFTA).
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vestment liberalization. These two foci give rise to rather differ-
ent views about the real appropriate exchange value of the peso
and ties into the recent peso crisis in Mexico. 4
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the theoretical
literature on the employment and economic impacts of a move-
ment to free trade. Part II evaluates some of the empirical stud-
ies which attempt to quantify the effects. There has, of course,
been a vast outpouring of literature on the effects of NAFTA.
The authors cannot review every study. However, we hope to
provide an overview or consensus view on the effects of NAFTA.
One conclusion we reach is that the long-run effects will not be
very great. We also provide some suggestions why the political
fallout from NAFTA has been so great given the relatively small
economic effects in the long run. Part III emphasizes that
NAFTA is more than a trade agreement and shows how the in-
vestment side of the agreement relates to the current peso
problem.
I. SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES
From the theory of comparative advantage one can derive
the following implications about the gains of trade:
1. If a country's relative domestic prices are, in the absence of
trade, different than the relative prices of the country with
which they would trade, the country can increase its income
by trading.
2. The smaller the country, the greater the potential gains
from trade, but all countries benefit to some extent.
3. A country will gain the most by exporting commodities that
it produces using its abundant factors of production most in-
tensively while importing those goods whose production re-
quire more of its scarce factors of production. Some of the
implications of the theory of comparative advantage can be
seen in Figure 1. We show the production possibilities curve
and community indifference curve for a country which has
abundant labor and scarce capital, e.g., Mexico, with the
production possibilities curve drawn to denote this fact.
That is, in order to produce some of the labor-intensive
goods it has to give up only a small amount of the capital-
4. Swen W. Arndt, NAFTA and the Mexican Peso, CLAREMONT POL'Y
BRIEFS (Claremont Center for Economic Policy Studies, Commons Institute for
International Economic Studies and Lowe Institute of Political Economy), Nov.
1994, at 2-3.
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intensive goods. Before trade, Mexico produces at point A
which is tangent to indifference curve I.
0
CC
trade
D °E
Exportables (labor intensive goods)
Figure 1. Gains from trade. A country, say Mexico, both
consumes and produces at point A. When it opens up trade
with a larger country, say the United States, it moves
production to point B and can increase its consumption of both
goods and consume at point C.
Now let's suppose trade is allowed. Mexico, as denoted in
Figure 1, taking advantage of its factors endowment, will pro-
duce more of its labor-intensive product and less of its capital-
intensive product and sell the additional labor-intensive product
to the United States with whom it has opened trade. Note that
the price of labor-intensive goods relative to the capital-inten-
sive goods is higher in the U.S. than Mexico. Mexico will expand
production of the labor-intensive product until it reaches point B
on the production possibilities curve. Mexico exports the
amount DB and imports the amount CD and moves to a higher
level of consumption and welfare than it could reach without
trade. Since Mexico is a small country relative to the United
States, it will not affect the U.S. terms of trade much. There-
fore, Mexico will gain the most from trade, although the United
States will also gain.
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The gains denoted are the result of eliminating trade barri-
ers for a fixed amount and quality of domestic factors of produc-
tion. These are known as the static gains from trade. In
addition, there can be dynamic gains from trade. The dynamic
gains result from an outward shift of the production possibilities
curve. Such an outward shift results from an increase in the
quantity or an improvement in the quality of the factors of pro-
duction. For example, reducing the barriers to trade generally
increases specialization and, as Adam Smith told us, this in-
creases the productivity of the factors of production, particularly
labor. There is learning by doing, which increases productivity
over time. Trade expands the extent of the market, allowing
economies of scale to be realized. In addition, as the industry
favored by the elimination of trade barriers expands, it will cre-
ate backward linkages for its inputs and create forward con-
sumption linkages. As a result, income in the economy should
increase. This will lead to increased savings which, if invested
in the local economy, will increase capital stock over time. In
sum, all these effects will shift the production possibilities out-
ward over time and will lead the population to higher and higher
levels of consumption and welfare.
The question naturally arises as to why, if all these positive
effects from the elimination of the barriers to trade occur, is
there so much opposition to freer trade? One reason is that even
in the long run there will be some gainers and some losers in the
movement to free trade. According to the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem, 5 there will be a tendency toward factor price equaliza-
tion. For example, as production moves from point A to point B
in Figure 1, resources will flow from capital-intensive goods pro-
duction toward labor-intensive goods production. This should
bid up the price of labor relative to the price of capital in Mexico
until their relative price matches the U.S. terms of trade. The
exact opposite is happening in the United States, where re-
sources are flowing from labor-intensive production toward more
capital-intensive production, and the price of labor falls relative
to the price of capital in the United States. Since the United
States has a much larger economy than Mexico, the terms of
trade will adjust less for the United States than for Mexico. In
5. See generally Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, Protection and
Real Wages, 9 Rzv. ECON. STUD. 58 (1941). Stolper and Samuelson have shown
that on certain restrictive assumptions, international trade necessarily lowers
the real wage of the scarce factor of production without it being necessary to
specify its pattern of consumption. MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS
404 (David W. Peaver ed., 3d ed. 1986).
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any case, the reward to the scarce factor of production will be
reduced. Since, presumably, the scarce factor of production in
the United States is labor, the reward to labor should fall. In
Mexico, the opposite should happen. In Mexico, where labor is
plentiful and capital is scarce, the reward to labor should in-
crease and the reward to capital should decrease.
The above is an example of the scarce factor of production
losing from freer trade in the long run. More likely the opposi-
tion to the movement toward freer trade comes from the short-
run costs which result from restructuring the economy. For ex-
ample, as the Mexican economy moves from point A to point B in
Figure 1, resources will have to relocate from import-competing
capital-intensive industries toward labor-intensive industries.
Firms will go out of business, workers will lose their jobs and in
general there will be some structural readjustment of resources
in the economy. Those who have to move will bear the costs of
the adjustment process. They may have to relocate and retrain
in order to obtain jobs in the expanding labor-intensive indus-
tries. Some workers will not be able to make the transition. For
example, some may have to go into early retirement. So even if
the transition is smooth, there will be losers along the way.
Opponents of freer trade argue that the transition will not
be smooth. At least in the short run, wages and prices will not
adjust enough to clear the markets. As a result, the initial reac-
tion to the elimination of trade barriers will not be a smooth
transition of resources from capital-intensive production to la-
bor-intensive production, but a movement of resources - labor
and business plant and equipment - into unemployment. In-
stead of movement along the production possibilities curve in
Figure 1 from point A to point B, the movement will be from
point A to point E; i.e., into unemployment and a position below
the production possibilities curve. Only after a long and drawn-
out transition would the economy move to point B.
As noted above, the theory of comparative advantage is
based on a given quantity of factors of production with no inter-
national mobility of productive factors. That assumption is obvi-
ously not true for the NAFTA countries of Canada, Mexico and
the United States. Although there is some restriction on the
movement of factors of production across the international bor-
ders, in practice there is considerable movement of factors
across borders. This possibly played a considerable role in the
debate in the United States over NAFTA. Although U.S. busi-
nesses could invest in Mexico prior to NAFTA, the passage of
1996]
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NAFTA makes it easier and, in fact, increases the incentive for
U.S. firms to close their U.S. plants and move south to Mexico
leaving unemployed U.S. workers in their wake.
Theoretical arguments can take us only so far, however, in
our analysis of the economic and employment implications of
NAFTA. We need to look at the empirical studies which attempt
to quantify these effects. It should be noted that most of the
costs from freer trade occur in the short run while most of the
benefits occur in the long run.
II. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
When one looks at NAFTA objectively, it is difficult to un-
derstand why it drew so much opposition, particularly in the
United States. We noted above that the impact of moving to-
ward free trade will be greater on the smaller country.
Table 1
Alternative Measures of Size for the United States, Canada
and Mexico 6
(all numbers refer to 1988 unless otherwise noted)
Purchasing
Gross National Parity GDP
Product Population Land Area per Worker
(Thousands
(Billions of (Thousands of 1985
1988 U.S. of Square International
Dollars) (Millions) Kilometers) Dollars)
United States 4,886.6 245.9 9.4 37.6
Canada 440.9 26.1 10.0 32.4
Mexico 147.3 83.6 2.0 14.6
The data in Table 1 portray the Mexican and Canadian econo-
mies as much smaller than the U.S. and Mexico as much poorer
than its two neighbors. For example, the GDP of the United
States is more than twenty-seven times greater than Mexico's
GDP. This suggests that NAFTA would have a much larger im-
pact on Canada and, particularly, on Mexico than on the United
States. In addition, the United States conducts only about one-
quarter of its trade with its North American neighbors. Canada
and Mexico, by contrast, undertake more than two-thirds of
their foreign trade with the United States. Thus, the impact on
6. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990 178-79 (1990);
Robert Summers & Alan Heston, The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded
Set of International Comparison, 1950-1988, 106 Q.J. ECON. 327, 351-52 (1991).
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the United States should be small relative to the trade impact
on Canada and Mexico.
NAFTA would eliminate most tariffs among the three coun-
tries, substantially reduce non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs)
and ensure the nearly free flow of capital throughout the region.
To see the full impact of the agreements on the three economies,
we must keep in mind a number of considerations. First, the
basic tariffs and NTBs at the start of the NAFTA agreements
were not very high. For example, U.S. tariffs on imports from
Mexico averaged about four percent. In 1991, Mexican tariffs on
imports from the United States averaged about eleven percent.
Similar low tariff levels existed between the United States and
Canada when the Canadian and U.S. agreement went into effect
in 1989.7 It is true that in 1985 Mexico was one of the most
closed economies in the world, with tariffs as high as 100%,
licenses required to import all goods and laws which prohibited
foreigners, with few exceptions, from owning more than forty-
nine percent of any business or private property. However,
Mexico has unilaterally reduced its tariffs and NTBs signifi-
cantly during the last several years.
Second, these agreements will be phased in over a fifteen
year period. Thus, any short run negative impacts should be
small. For example, the job relocations which have been the fo-
cus of much recent debate will not be discernible in the
macroeconomic data. Most of the projections of job losses and
gains are in the four to five hundred thousand range, with most
predicting a net gain for the United States. A 1992 study on the
effects of NAFTA, for example, projects a net gain of 170,000
U.S. jobs over the first five years of the agreement.8 Gross job
displacements that occur annually in the dynamic U.S. economy
are much larger than that. Over the five years up to 1990, some
8.9 million workers reported that they had been displaced from
their jobs, meaning they are permanently laid off because of a
plant closing or employer bankruptcy.9
Third, macroeconomic changes in the economy will swamp
any effects of NAFTA on the economy. During the recent reces-
sions in the United States and Canada, many more workers lost
their jobs than will lose them as a result of NAFTA. In the
7. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281.
8. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. ScHoTr, NAFTA: AN ASSESS-
MENT 15 (1993).
9. Michael Podgursky, The Industrial Structure of Job Displacement,
1979-1989, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1992, at 17, 20.
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United States, the unemployment rate rose during 1989-1991
from about 5.5 to 7.5%. This means more than two million work-
ers lost their jobs during that two year period. The unemploy-
ment rate in Canada increased from 7.5% in 1989 to 11.3% in
1993, which translates into more than one-half million addi-
tional unemployed.
Meanwhile, the Canadian dollar appreciated twenty percent
relative to the U.S. dollar from 1987 to 1990.10 This twenty per-
cent appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dol-
lar resulted in a twenty percent price increase for both the
Canadian import-competing and export firms. The Canadian-
U.S. free trade agreement on the other hand resulted in only a
three to four percent price disadvantage for import-competing
firms as a result of Canadian tariff reductions. Canadian export
industries gained from the free trade agreement since U.S. tar-
iffs on these exported goods were lowered. In other words, the
appreciation of the Canadian currency vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar
had a six to seven times greater relative price effect than the
change in tariffs which resulted from the free trade agreement.
A similar story can be told about Mexico, as seen in Table 2.
From 1980 to 1987, the Mexican peso real exchange rate depre-
ciated eighty-one percent vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and appreci-
ated relative to the U.S. dollar nearly the same amount by 1991.
Such large swings in real exchange rates totally swamp any
change in relative prices in the two countries which may result
from the tariff reducing agreements.
Table 2
Real Exchange Rate Index Mexico/United States1
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Index 100 102.8 139.0 151.3 138.4 136.3 177.4 181.0 144.1 136.4 130.0 107.2
One of the strongest reasons for opposition to NAFTA in the
United States at the time of its passage was the fact that
NAFTA was more than a trade agreement. It also allowed the
free flow of capital throughout the region. Opponents of NAFTA
argued that U.S. firms would take advantage of lowered capital
restrictions to move their companies to Mexico in order to ex-
ploit low wage rates.
10. Paul Wonnacott & Ronald Wonnacott, Canada-U.S. Free Trade: Retro-
spect and Prospect, 2 N. AM. REV. ECON. & FiN. 94, 99 (1991).
11. Timothy J. Kehoe, Assessing the Economic Impact of North American
Free Trade (Oct. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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This argument ignores the fact that there were many incen-
tives for U.S. firms to move to Mexico prior to NAFTA. Until a
few years ago, Mexico followed what is termed an "import sub-
stitution strategy" of economic development. This was an at-
tempt to substitute domestic production for imports of
manufactured goods. This is done by setting high tariffs on im-
ported manufactured goods and low or zero tariffs on the inputs
used by the domestic manufacturing firms. The result is a high
effective tariff rate. This rate increases with the decrease in the
percentage of domestic added value in the manufacturing pro-
cess. To see this, consider the effective rate of protection (ERP),
which can be written as follows:
ERP = P~t - (1)
where P, is world price of a unit of output, C, is the world price
of imported inputs used in producing a unit of output, t. is the
tariff rate on competing imports and t, is the tariff rate on im-
ported inputs.
As an example, suppose that the production of $100 of cloth
valued at world market prices requires $60 of imported inputs
valued at world prices. Suppose also that the tariff rate on com-
peting imports (t.) is twenty percent, while the tariff rate on im-
ported inputs (ti) is ten percent.
ERP = 100(.20) - 60(.10) = 20 - 6 = 14 = .35 or 35% (2)
100 - 60 40 40
If, on the other hand, the domestic added value is only ten per-
cent and the tariff rate on imported inputs (t,) is zero, the tariff
rate becomes
ERP = 100(.20) - 90(0) = 20 = 2 or 200% (3)
100 - 90 10
This tariff structure provides a strong incentive for foreign firms
to enter into a joint venture with Mexican businesses to get be-
hind these high tariff walls into the Mexican market. As the ex-
ample shows, the lower the Mexican content of the product, the
higher the tariff walls. This provides strong incentives for these
firms to enter into assembly type operations which require low
cost unskilled labor.
The movement of firms south of the border was further
stimulated when the Maquiladora, or free trade zone, program
was set up mainly along the Mexico-U.S. border. This allowed
1996]
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U.S. companies to establish assembly operations along the Mexi-
can border. The firms could import parts from the U.S. duty
free, assemble them just across the Mexican border using inex-
pensive unskilled Mexican labor, and export the assembled
products to the U.S. with duty paid only on the Mexican added
value. The Maquiladora operation has expanded greatly in re-
cent years. By January 1992, the program included about 1,954
factories, employing about half a million workers. 12 This rapid
growth has also created environmental problems along the U.S.-
Mexican border.
Thus, much U.S. foreign investment has already flowed
south of the border. As Table 3 shows, the amount of total for-
eign investment in Mexico has increased in recent years as the
Mexican economy has grown more rapidly and has become more
open. It is true that the level of foreign investment, particularly
portfolio investment, in Mexico decreased from 1993 to 1994.
This was due, however, more to the financial crisis which oc-
curred toward the end of 1994 than to NAFTA. We discuss this
in more detail in Part III.
Table 3
Foreign Investment in Mexico13
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994
Direct
Investment 1,522 3,248 2,595 3,037 2,622 4,762 4,389 7,980
Portfolio
Investment - - - 493 1,995 7,540 28,919 8,186
Total 1,522 3,248 2,595 3,530 4,628 12,302 33,308 16,166
Both Mexico and Canada have had large capital inflows
over the past several years. This has led to the real appreciation
of their currencies alluded to above. No doubt some capital in-
flows have occurred in anticipation of NAFTA, but most were
the result of macroeconomic influences which have a greater im-
pact on the two economies than NAFTA.
The above discussion centered on the macroeconomic influ-
ences on the three economies which are part of NAFTA. There
have also been a number of more microeconomic-level studies
12. Kathryn Kopinak, The Maquiladorization of the Mexican Economy, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 141 (Ricardo Grin-
spun & Maxwell A. Cameron eds. 1993).
13. Kehoe, supra note 11, at table 5; BANCO DE MEXICO, INFORME ANNUAL
1994, 181 (1994).
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using multisectoral general equilibrium models to analyze the
impact of eliminating the barriers to trade. A whole industry
has arisen applying these general equilibrium models to mea-
sure the quantitative impact of NAFTA. Fortunately, these ef-
forts have been summarized and evaluated in a paper by
Drusilla K. Brown.14 Our discussion here highlights the results
and draws heavily on her analysis. Briefly, the applied general
equilibrium models work as follows. The modeler sets up a
model which specifies the factors of production, the nature of
technology and household preferences. The firms employ these
factors and supply output with the goal of maximizing profits.
Households supply the factors of production, receive factor pay-
ments and purchase consumer goods in such a manner as to
maximize utility. After the model has been estimated, the mod-
eler can perform counter-factual experiments in which the trade
barriers are modified and eliminated. The models are estimated
and the economic impact of changes in trade barriers can be
evaluated.
The overall size of the impact depends on modeling assump-
tions. The first generation of these models assumed constant re-
turns scale technology and perfectly competitive goods markets.
In these models the impact of NAFTA is small since they only
incorporate the gains due to countries expanding the production
of goods in which they have a comparative advantage and
thereby increase efficiency within North America. For example,
one model calculates the effect of a three-country agreement
which removes tariffs only.15 Mexico's welfare rises only 0.11%
and U.S. welfare rises by 0.07%. If, in addition, the non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) were removed, the gains are larger: 2.28% for
Mexico and 1.67% for the United States.
Such small gains are not unexpected given the size of the
tariffs that will be removed. In addition, these models include
the assumption of national product differentiation. Product dif-
ferentiation on both the import and export sides tends to
dampen the response of the domestic price system and lower the
response to price changes. When this assumption is dropped,
the responses are greater.
14. Drusilla K, Brown, The Impact of a North American Free Trade Area:
Applied General Equilibrium Models (June 8, 1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors).
15. DAVID ROLAND-HOLST ET AL., NORTH AMERICAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION
AND THE ROLE OF NONTARIFF BARRIERs, Model I (Mills College Working Paper,
Apr. 1992).
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The small responses of the first generation models led nu-
merous modelers to incorporate economies of scale and imper-
fect competition in their models. 16 The modelers argued,
particularly for Canada and Mexico, that the size of the market
was not large enough to use all the economies of scale in certain
industries. Also, the small size of the markets would tend to
lead to imperfect competition. More gains would result if the
gains in efficiency from economies of scale and price competition
were added to the models.
Table 4
Applied General Equilibrium Estimates of the Impact of
NAFTA17 Changes in Economic Welfare
(total amounts shown in billions of U.S. dollars)
Mexico Canada United States
Percent Percent Percent
Scenario Total GDP Total GDP Total GDP
NAFTA 1.98 1.6 3.51 0.7 6.45 0.1
Tariffs, NTBs
NAFTA 6.30 5.0 3.66 0.7 13.23 0.3
Tariffs, NTBs
Foreign
Investment
U.S.-Mexico 1.93 1.5 0.08 0.0 3.66 0.1
Tariffs, NTBs
U.S.-Mexico 6.26 4.9 0.23 0.0 10.65 0.2
Tariffs, NTBs
Foreign
Investment
U.S.-Canada 0.04 0.0 3.36 0.6 2.87 0.1
Tariffs only
The results reproduced in Table 4 are typical of the results of
the impact of NAFTA on welfare for the models which include
economies of scale and the elimination of price imperfections.
The impact of NAFTA as a percentage of GDP is largest in Mex-
16. See, e.g., Horacio E. Sobarzo, A General Equilibrium Analysis of the
Gains From Trade for the Mexican Economy of a North American Free Trade
Agreement, in MODELING NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (Patrick J.
Kehoe & Timothy J. Kehoe eds., 1995); Drusilla K. Brown et al., A North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement: Analytical Issues and Computational Assessment,
15 WORLD ECON. 11 (1992); David Cox & Richard G. Harris, North American
Free Trade and Its Implications for Canada: Results from a C.G.E. Model of
North American Trade, 15 WORLD ECON. 31 (1992); ROLAND-HOLST ET AL.,
supra note 15.
17. Brown et al., supra note 16, at 22.
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ico and smallest in the United States, with Canada in between.
Note that with the elimination of tariffs and NTBs, the impact of
NAFTA remains, except possibly for Mexico, very small. Al-
lowing foreign investment to flow into Mexico from the United
States or from the rest of the world has a big impact.
Unfortunately, the overall impact of NAFTA depends on the
modeling assumptions employed in building various models.
Drusilla Brown explains this in detail in her summary. 18 For
our purpose here, we should note that capital flows are exoge-
nously imposed in all the models. How much capital flow a
NAFTA agreement would create is an open question. U.S. oppo-
nents of the agreement argued that the flow from the United
States into Mexico of direct investment would be substantial, re-
sulting in a negative impact on the U.S. economy. Proponents,
on the other hand, reached the opposite conclusion.
In addition, the degree of market imperfections and the
available economies of scale are also set by the modelers. The
greater the current market imperfections and the larger the
economies of scale which are available, the greater the benefits
derived from NAFTA. However, different models obtain differ-
ent results depending on the assumptions made. Most modelers
vary their assumptions to see how sensitive the results are to
crucial assumptions in their model. However, it is important to
note that there is a net welfare gain for all countries from
NAFTA under a wide range of underlying assumptions.
It is also interesting to note that the Stopler-Samuelson re-
sult,19 which predicts that the real return to at least one factor
should fall in each country as a result of trade liberalization,
does not hold true in most of the models. Under Stopler-Samuel-
son, the United States, as the labor-scarce country, should suffer
a decline in real wages and Mexico should experience a decline
in the return to capital. These models do not show this quanti-
tative result. In particular, the models show that both real
wages and the real return to capital in all countries increases.
In the context of increasing returns to scale and the market im-
perfections which freer trade eliminates, this result is not too
surprising. What is troubling, however, is that it occurs even in
models without economies of scale and initial market
imperfections.
One positive aspect of these models is that they provide
enough details so that sectors which will probably expand and
18. See generally Brown, supra note 14.
19. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
1996]
MINN. J GLOBAL TADE
sectors which will contract can be pinpointed. The results are
not too surprising. For example, agriculture will expand, with
grain and oil seed production expanding in Canada and the
United States and contracting in Mexico. Sugar producers and
apparel producers will lose market share to Mexican producers.
The results for the automobile and textile industries are ambig-
uous. However, these results depend on how much the NTBs
will be removed and how much domestic content is written into
the law. Most of the models were estimated before the treaty
was finalized. One important future use of these models would
be to evaluate the impact of all the exceptions which have been
written into the treaty.
Another fact should be mentioned. NAFTA is a trilateral
agreement and not a multilateral agreement, thus the tariffs
and NTBs between the treaty signatories and countries outside
the North American Free Trade Area will remain in force. The
treaty, therefore, will cause some trade diversion. However, the
models do seem to agree that benefits from the trade created as
a result of NAFTA will more than offset the trade diverted by
the treaty. This is particularly true of Canada and Mexico, since
such a large share of their trade already occurs within North
America. U.S. tariffs, however, are already so low that con-
sumption distortions created by NAFTA should be quite small.
These static models leave a number of important questions
unanswered. For example, they are not able to provide evidence
on the implications of an agreement for trade balance, exchange
rates and capital formation. Recently, there have been attempts
to remedy this problem by using endogenous growth models.
Some of these place great emphasis on the importance of inter-
national trade in accelerating growth. For example, a model
designed by Timothy Kehoe calculates that trade liberalization
would raise Mexican output per worker fifty-one percent in
thirty years.20
The problem with all these analyses, which are only in the
beginning stages, is the same as that of all the endogenous
growth modeling. The researchers note that economies grow
faster than can be explained by the growth of inputs. They build
a model which allows for increased productivity of inputs and
search for one particular crucial input which can "explain" this
increase in productivity. For some, this has been investment in
20. Timothy J. Kehoe, Towards a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of
North American Trade 20 (March 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
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business, plant and equipment. For others, it has been invest-
ment in infrastructure. For modelers in the trade area and
those studying the implications of NAFTA, it is the effects of in-
creased openness in the economies which in various ways in-
creases productivity growth. The basic problem with this
approach is that each researcher has a "pet" explanation for the
accelerating growth. There is no objective way to decide which
is the correct explanation.
Although there has been considerable effort spent to build
and estimate applied general equilibrium models in the past two
decades, there has been little effort to evaluate their perform-
ances after the policy changes have taken place. One exception
is a recent study conducted by Timothy Kehoe, Clemente Polo
and Ferran Sancho, which assesses the performance of the
model of the Spanish economy that the authors built in 1984-85
to analyze Spain's entry into the European Economic Commu-
nity.2 1 The authors compare the changes in relative prices, pro-
duction levels, returns to factors of production and major
components of GDP predicted by the model and the changes that
actually took place. The comparisons lead to mixed results. The
model appears to predict changes in real variables better than in
relative prices. As shown in Table 5, the correlation between
the model predictions and actual relative price changes is close
to zero. The authors note that the poor prediction of the model
resulted from external macroeconomic shocks, in particular, the
fall of the international price of oil and the exceptionally bad
harvest in Spain in 1986. When the model is adjusted for these
unforeseen events, the correlation between the actual relative
price changes and those predicted by the model improves sub-
stantially, as noted in column 3 of table 5.
21. Timothy J. Kehoe et al., An Evaluation of the Performance of an Ap-
plied General Equilibrium Model of the Spanish Economy (Oct. 1991) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with authors).
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Table 5.
Comparison of Spanish Model's Prediction with the Data22
(Percentage change in relative price)
Actual Adjusted
Sector 1985-86 Model Model
1. Food and Nonalcoholic Beverages 1.8 -2.3 1.7
2. Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages 3.9 2.5 5.8
3. Clothing 2.1 5.6 6.6
4. Housing -3.2 -2.2 -4.8
5. Household Articles 0.1 2.2 2.9
6. Medical Services -0.7 -4.8 -4.2
7. Transportation -4.0 2.6 -6.6
8. Recreation -1.4 -1.3 0.1
9. Other Services 2.9 1.1 2.8
Weighted Correlation with 1985-19862 1,000 -0.079 0.936
Change in sectoral price index deflated by appropriate aggregate price index.
Weighted correlation coefficients with actual changes 1985-1986. The
weights used are: 1) 0.2540; 2) 0.0242; 3) 0.0800; 4) 0.1636; 5) 0.0772; 6)
0.0376; 7) 0.01342; 8) 0.0675; 9) 0.1617. These are the consumption shares
in the model's benchmark year, which is 1980.
This exercise demonstrates a fact discussed earlier.
Macroeconomic changes can swamp the prediction of these
microeconomics-oriented models. The Spanish experience reit-
erates this fact. The Spanish experience shows that real ex-
change rate movements can swamp the effects of lowering
tariffs. Between 1985, the year before Spain's entry into EC,
and 1990 Spain's real exchange rate appreciated more than
thirty-five percent. The real exchange rate is an index of the
rate at which a domestic basket of goods trades for an interna-
tional basket of goods. Such an appreciation would tend to dis-
courage exports and encourage imports. In other words, the
appreciation of the Spanish currency resulted in a price disad-
vantage of more than thirty-five percent for Spain's exporters,
much more than the positive effects of any reduction in tariffs.
Given the fact that the short-run macro effects will more
than offset the impact of NAFTA and that the long run welfare
gains are relatively small, and given the low level of tariffs cur-
rently in force, some might argue that negotiating a trade agree-
ment may not have been worth the trouble. Although from a
macroeconomic perspective the gains may not be that large, the
benefit-cost ratios are still quite substantial. For example, stud-
ies at the microeconomic level have attempted to measure soci-
ety's benefits relative to the costs workers would endure if tariffs
22. Kehoe, supra note 11, at table 3.
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were eliminated. 23 In the U.S. textile and clothing industries,
the benefits to society would be $14 for each $1 cost to the work-
ers. A Canadian study which included non-tariff barriers,
showed a benefit-cost ratio of seventy to one. Therefore, there
are considerable net benefits to be gained from elimination of
trade barriers.
III. NAFTA AND THE PESO PROBLEM
As noted above, NAFTA is more than a trade agreement. It
allows the free movement of capital throughout the region. The
movement of foreign capital has been intertwined with the re-
cent peso crisis in Mexico. This crisis is, in turn, another exam-
ple of how the short-run macroeconomic changes can swamp the
trade impact of NAFTA.
First, we need some background information. During 1993
and 1994, many analysts and commentators expressed concern
that the peso was becoming "too strong". In 1994, the "real"
value or purchasing power of the Mexican peso increased about
ten percent.24 The real exchange rate is the nominal rate ad-
justed for differences between U.S. and Mexican inflation rates.
Thus, real peso appreciation can occur along with nominal de-
preciation of the peso if the Mexican inflation rate runs ahead of
U.S. inflation. This is what had been occurring with the Mexican
peso.
The Mexican authorities had been managing the nominal
value of the peso by means of a crawling peg. Each day Mexican
authorities allowed the nominal value of the peso to fall a prede-
termined amount. During 1993 and 1994, the Mexican authori-
ties had not allowed the nominal value of the peso to fall as
much as the difference between the Mexican and U.S. inflation
rates. As a result, the real value of the peso increased.
Why was this a concern? It was a concern because of the
contradictory nature of NAFTA from the point of view of Mex-
ico. 25 On one hand, those who emphasized NAFTA as an agree-
ment to liberalize trade argued that the peso should not increase
in real value against the dollar since this would curtail Mexican
exports to the United States. A higher real value of the peso
would increase the dollar price of Mexican goods. On the import
side, they see the appreciation of the peso as adding to the ad-
23. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, 1984 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 40 (1984);
WORLD BANK, 1987 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 152 (1987).
24. See Arndt, supra note 4, at 1.
25. See generally id.
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justment problems of import-competing industries which have
lost trade protection as a result of NAFTA. The outward signs of
an overvalued peso were the large and growing trade deficit and
a large current account deficit in the balance of payments, as
shown in Table 6.
It is interesting to note that the trade deficit with the
NAFTA countries did not increase much and that the deficit
with the United States improved between 1993 and 1994. This
evidence supports the view that trade changes in NAFTA did
not create the financial crisis in 1994-1995.
Table 6
Mexico's Trade Deficit 26
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
1993 1994
Overall Trade Deficit -13.5 -18.5
Trade Deficit with NAFTA Countries -30.2 -3.2
Trade Deficit with U.S. -3.4 +.37
Those, including the Salinas government, who focused on
the investment liberalization aspect of NAFTA wanted a higher
valued peso to attract foreign capital inflows to boost private
capital formation and public infrastructure development to
levels that Mexico's domestic saving rate alone could not sup-
port. A higher valued peso would lower the peso price of imports
of U.S. capital goods needed by Mexican firms to modernize their
plant and equipment.
This dichotomy of views resulted from two different visions
of how best to promote Mexico's economic development. Those
who want the peso's real value to remain low see economic
growth as led by exports. A low value of the peso means that the
dollar price of Mexican goods and services will be low. This will
promote exports of Mexican goods to the United States. As ex-
ports expand, resources will be reallocated toward the export in-
dustry. Thus it would appear that a weak peso is especially
attractive if growth in Mexico is to be concentrated in the export
sector. This would, in addition, result in a current account
surplus.
If, however, growth is to be more balanced throughout the
economy and if domestic saving is believed not to be large
26. Private communication from Dr. Jaime SerraPuche, Visiting Fellow,
Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University
(Dec. 1995).
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enough to support the desired growth rate, a strong peso is
needed. A strong peso will attract foreign capital and invest-
ment goods. It will lead to a current account deficit and an in-
flow of foreign saving which can be used to invest more broadly
throughout the economy.
Prior to the peso crisis in December 1994, the argument in
favor of a strong peso which would attract foreign investment
and saving had the upper hand. Policy makers had also been
slowing the rate of inflation. From rates of more than 150% in
1987, annual inflation had been brought down to a single-digit
level by 1993. With conservative monetary and fiscal policies,
economic liberalization and the creation of NAFTA, Mexico en-
joyed prospects for a high growth rate and capital inflows which
allowed it to add to foreign reserves. These foreign reserves had
risen to over $25 billion by the beginning of 1994. The future
looked bright for Mexico.
Despite this rosy scenario, there were questions lurking in
the background. Some observers feared that some of the capital
inflows were not of the direct investment type, but were driven
by short-term ephemeral considerations. The latter could be
fickle and move out of Mexico as quickly as the funds came in.
Capital of this type could destabilize the foreign exchange mar-
ket and create problems in the fragile Mexican financial system.
Policy makers had to be on guard for problems of this nature. In
fact, during the three years prior to the crisis, Mexico attracted
$91 billion in foreign capital, two-thirds being easy-to-withdraw
portfolio investment.2 7 In the face of potentially destabilizing
foreign investment flows, stable domestic economic policies as
well as stable political environments became essential.
Second, some economists worried that the real exchange
rate was being allowed to increase too much.28 As noted above,
allowing the peso to appreciate in order to create substantial
capital inflows was a goal of the Mexican government. This re-
sulted in an overall balance of payments equilibrium based on a
structure of capital account surpluses and current account defi-
cits and a resulting large trade deficit. As noted above, not all
economic observers agreed that this was the correct policy to
pursue. Investors began to wonder if a much more rapid nomi-
nal depreciation of the peso was in the cards.
27. Economic Survey of Mexico, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28-Nov. 3, 1995, at Mex-
ico Survey 1, Mexico Survey 5.
28. Rudiger Dornbusch, an MIT economist, was the most outspoken of this
group. See id.
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In the first part of 1994, a number of adverse political
events added to this potentially volatile mix. These were the
Chiapas rebellion, the March assassination of the presidential
candidate of the ruling PRI political party and the September
assassination of the ruling party's Secretary General. As the
year progressed, other uncertainties arose. Questions were
raised whether the ruling party's PRI candidate would lose. It
was generally assumed that such a loss would lead to changes in
economic policy less favorable for investment. As early as April
1994, nervous investors began to liquidate holdings of peso in-
struments. 29 With each new shock, foreign resources fell. At
the start of the year reserves stood at twenty-five billion dollars
but had fallen to six billion dollars by the end of the year. To
avert a run on the peso, the Mexican government issued short-
term dollar-indexed bonds called tesobonos. This was supposed
to give investors enough protection to allow them to maintain
their capital in Mexico. However, the measure was unsuccessful
and the government found itself facing repayments of $29 billion
worth of tesobonos in 1995.
In December 1994, Mexico was forced to allow the peso to
float. It very quickly depreciated thirty-five percent against the
dollar, from about 3.5 pesos per dollar to about 5.5 pesos per
dollar. The peso has continued to fall, reaching a low 8.25 pesos
to the dollar in November 1995 or a decline of about sixty per-
cent in value since the crisis began.3 0 The impact on the econ-
omy has been devastating. Real output has fallen more than
nine percent since the crisis began, unemployment is up, infla-
tion has increased to more than forty percent on an annual basis
and the short-term interest rate rose to nearly ninety percent in
March 1995 before the financial bail-out by the United States
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).3 1 Some observers
have argued that the current recession "is the deepest Mexico
has seen since the great depression."32 Once again, we see that
the short-term macroeconomic changes have swamped any ef-
fects on trade flows. The large decline in value of the peso has
turned the Mexican trade balance from a large deficit with the
29. Rogelio Ramirez De La 0, Reform of International Financial Institu-
tions: A Mexican View, 5 N. AM. OUTLOOK 67, 67 (1995).
30. See Craig Torres & Paul B. Carrol, Mexico's Central Bank Shores Up
Peso, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1995, at A3, A6.
31. Paul B. Carroll, Optimism Remains for Mexican Economy, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 13, 1995, at All.
32. Craig Torres & Paul B. Carroll, Mexico's Economy Contracts Sharply,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at All.
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United States to a surplus. In fact, the export sector in Mexico
has shown some impressive gains.
In hindsight, one can see where Mexico went wrong. The
government placed too much emphasis on the relatively stable
nominal peso exchange rate. Given the relative inflation rates
in Mexico and the United States, that meant that the real peso
exchange was appreciating against the dollar. Given that main-
taining the value of the peso was a top priority of the Mexican
government, it found it necessary to follow rather restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies in 1993. These policies led to a
slowing Mexican economic growth rate. Mexico began to experi-
ence a serious problem of overdue loans in its banking system.
Foreigners began to question the long-term prospects for the
Mexican economy. This, along with the usual speculation
against the peso, resulted in a situation ripe for crisis in 1994.
In 1994, the Bank of Mexico monetized the outflow of short-term
capital by issuing the dollar-indexed tesobonos. This made for-
eign investors even more nervous. The political instability in
1994 was the final straw that broke the camel's back.
It should be noted that despite the financial crisis, the long-
term prospects for Mexico are quite good, assuming the political
instability in the country can be resolved. Mexico's current ac-
count and its trade balance have moved from deficit to surplus.
The financial bail out by the United States and the IMF seems
to be working. Political and economic reforms seem to be *contin-
uing. Economic growth for 1996 is projected to become positive.
Foreign companies have outlined plans to invest $6.3 billion in
the country in 1996. This sum represents a fifty-three percent
increase over 1995. 33
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have evaluated the economic basis of the
controversy surrounding NAFTA. First, we highlighted the the-
oretical analyses of what the employment and economic impacts
of a movement to free trade would be. We noted that, according
to the theoretical literature, the countries will garner net bene-
fits from the removal of trade barriers. However, there will be
some net losers and there may be considerable transitional
costs. Second, we provided an overview of the empirical studies
which have attempted to quantify these economic effects. We
found that, from a macroeconomic perspective, the magnitude of
33. Foreign Investment in Mexico, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1995, at A14.
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the net gains is not large. Given the size of the tariffs and NTBs
this should not be surprising. Only by assuming significant
economies of scale, market imperfections and foreign capital
flows would the net gains be significant. Unfortunately, the size
of the scale economies, market imperfections and foreign capital
flows had been set arbitrarily by the researchers. Third,
macroeconomic changes in the economies have a much larger
economic and employment impact than does NAFTA. For exam-
ple, a movement toward free trade appears to lead to a capital
inflow which causes a significant appreciation of a country's real
exchange rate. This movement in the real exchange rate more
than offsets the price advantage for export firms from the reduc-
tion in tariffs. Recessions and other macroeconomic shocks have
more employment effects than will result from NAFTA. The
normal structural changes in a dynamic economy will create
more employment impact in any given year than NAFTA would.
The question naturally arises as to why there is so much
political controversy over the NAFTA proposal when: (1) it pro-
vides positive, but probably small, gains for the countries in-
volved; (2) employment and other structural changes as a result
of NAFTA will be small relative to the effects of normal
macroeconomic changes in a dynamic economy; and (3) the ef-
fects will be spread out over fifteen years. Several answers come
to mind. First, the gains from reducing trade barriers spread
out across the population with each individual gainer benefiting
only a little. On the other hand, the losses are concentrated on
particular individuals. A textile worker, for example, who
senses a possible job loss and who may have to retrain, move or
retire early, feels the negative effects very strongly. Politicians
can play on that fear. Second, the impacts of NAFTA are not
widely understood and the specific impacts on particular indus-
tries, plants or jobs is not easily predictable. This leaves room
for politicians to have a field day. They can exaggerate the im-
pact for political purposes. This forces the other side to exagger-
ate the gains.
Finally, the recent peso crisis is another example of how
short run macroeconomic changes can swamp the trade impact
of NAFTA. This crisis resulted from a conflict in the policy to be
followed under NAFTA in Mexico. Those who emphasized the
trade expansion part of NAFTA wanted to allow the nominal
value of the peso to depreciate enough so that the real value of
the peso could remain stable. This would promote Mexican ex-
ports. Those who focused on the investment liberalization as-
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pect of NAFTA argued that the real value of the peso must be
allowed to increase in order to promote foreign investment in
Mexico. The latter argument prevailed in the Salinas adminis-
tration. With hindsight, one can say that the real value of the
peso was allowed to increase too much. This, along with polit-
ical instability in Mexico and rising interest rates in the United
States, led to crisis.

